In January, 2012, we first inquired as to whether Hawker Beechcraft Defense Company (HBDC) had been improperly excluded from the competitive range of the $355 million Light Air Support contract award, leaving Sierra Nevada Corporation (SNC) as the only remaining source and automatic winner.

Mystery surrounded the procurement, as we noted. A key question concerned why the Air Force’s notice of exclusion lay on the contract manager’s desk for two weeks, unopened, so that HBDC’s request for a contracting officer debriefing was made untimely. Not only that, but its protest at the GAO was ruled untimely as well. We were also interested in how HBDC could submit a proposal so flawed that it was judged by the Source Selection Team to be irredeemable, and thus excluded from the competitive range.

About two months later, we wrote that the Air Force had terminated SNC’s contract award and was launching an investigation into the original source selection decision. We opined as follows—

Anytime you’ve got the Secretary of the Air Force commenting on the deficiencies of a contract award, you can be fairly sure there are going to be career-limiting consequences for some body, or bodies.

And it was more than that, of course. USAF General Norton Schwartz called the LAS contract award situation “an embarrassment” and “a profound disappointment.” The four-star general warned of “drastic disciplinary action” if there was wrongdoing on the part of the Source Selection Team.

Ultimately, as we told our readers, the Air Force decided to reopen the competition—but without flying the two competing aircraft. This prompted SNC to file suit at the Court of Federal Claims, claiming the revised evaluation methodology impermissibly favored HBDC.

On November 1, 2012, Judge Christine Miller issued her opinion, ruling against SNC. Her opinion offered new light on this mysterious procurement. Rather than reviewing her opinion, we want to share with you the facts that have emerged.

• The Government was divided. The Air Force Program Manager and the Department of Justice attorney had a dysfunctional relationship. (“The record reflects an uphill battle by DOJ and agency counsel in working with Air Force personnel to assemble the administrative record.”) The PM told Agency Counsel that he did not trust the DOJ attorney.

• The record revealed “potential bias” by the Program Contracting Officer (PCO). (“After submission of SNC’s Final Proposal Revision (“FPR”), the PCO stated that she needed to reopen discussions with SNC for administrative purposes. … Despite being instructed that she must prepare a formal letter to reopen discussions, the PCO did not do so, contributing to an appearance of favoritism toward SNC.”)

• The Air Force investigation confirmed HBDC’s suspicious that SNC had received favorable treatment by the Source Selection Team. (“After marshaling all of the evidence, Brig. Gen. Dennis arrived at several conclusions, including finding issues with documentation of the procurement, inconsistencies in evaluation of the offerors’ proposals, and bias exhibited in favor of SNC. … The CDI Report revealed evidence of bias in favor of SNC.”)

• HBDC’s inability to timely request a debrief stemmed from the PCO’s transmission of the downselect letter by mail—to the wrong address. (“… despite an agreed plan to notify the offerors of elimination and FPR requests by mail, the PCO also sent an FPR notification to SNC by e-mail, whereas the PCO sent notice of elimination to HBDC by mail to the wrong address, resulting in a delay that prevented HBDC from timely requesting a debrief.”)

• The Air Force PCO was not competent to participate in this complex procurement. (“In response to comments from agency counsel that the PCO’s proposed Competitive Range Determination (the ‘CRD’), which eliminated HBDC, was unsatisfactory, the PCO stated that she was not qualified to write it.”)

So the LAS competition continues. SNC and HBDC are locked in a battle for nearly $400 million worth of aircraft. The Air Force needs to pick a winner. In the meantime, the war fighters don’t have the planes they supposedly require.

From our point of view, the story that emerges is one in which the Program Contracting Officer—who is responsible for policing the acquisition from a compliance perspective—was far out of her comfort zone. As a result of the leadership vacuum from the PCO, the technical and program management personnel ran amuck.

We trust that DCMA Leadership is thinking very hard about its evaluation of its Contracting Officers, and the criteria used to determine who is ready to support a large, complex, contentious procurement. Because this is something that absolutely needs to be gotten right, every time.