What a combat laser pointer may look like. Source: B.E. Meyers.

Our very first, fumbling attempt to try a blog article on government contracting matters discussed the use of laser pointers in combat. In what we called a “great victory” the U.S. Army’s Rapid Fielding Initiative had provided green laser pointers (also known as “Visual Warning Technology” or VWT) to combat troops in Iraq. The laser pointers were used in checkpoint operations, to warn oncoming drivers to stop. We thought that was pretty cool.

In fact, it was so cool that—as we reported—the Canadian Defence National Forces had spent C$7.2 million to acquire 750 “VWT systems and ancillaries” (including the ability to operate the “pumped-up green laser pointers” remotely) for its troops in Iraq.

So far, so good. From PowerPoint presentations to check-point operations. It seemed to us that the DOD was doing a great job of adopting commercial technology for its troops in an effective and rapid manner.

But a recent article by FierceGovernmentIT caused us to rethink our initial euphoria. The article pointed a finger at the U.S. Marine Corps, and accused USMC leadership of failing their Marines by unnecessarily delaying acquisition of similar laser pointers.

According to the story, “an urgent need” by the Marine Corps for VWT (or what FierceGovernmentIT and the DOD Inspector General called “laser dazzlers”) “went unfulfilled for six months longer than necessary thanks mostly to disagreement over which laser dazzler to buy.” The article, citing a DOD Inspector General audit report, said that “the Marine Corps Combat Development Command took 15 months in total to respond to an urgent field request from the forward deployed Second Marine Expeditionary Force in Iraq for the dazzlers.”

Marines at checkpoints were relying on “smoke signals and flares” to warn civilians they were approaching a Marine position, and issued “an urgent request” for combat laser pointers to halt movement of potential threats without the need to fire on them. According to the FierceGovernmentIT story—

The [Marine Corps] development command initially responded briskly to an urgent request for dazzlers filed by June 9, 2005 by the commanding general of the Second [Marine Expeditionary Force] MEF. But, when a force rotation replaced the Second MEF with the First MEF, the command deferred further processing of the request because the commanding general of the new forward deployed MEF disagreed with the choice of dazzler, the [DOD IG] report says.

The new commanding general preferred a dazzler that lacked a favorable positive safety recommendation--and, when the Marine Corps Requirements Oversight Council approved a contract for the originally selected dazzler in September 2006, the First MEF commanding general reacted by buying 28 of the non-approved dazzlers anyway for $323,324. Those dazzlers were never fielded, the report adds.

The DOD IG report (link above) found problems with oversight of the urgent needs fulfillment process and some significant administrative delays.

With respect to the issue(s) summarized by FierceGovernmentIT, the DOD IG found that, ”Nine days after MARCORSYSCOM awarded the contract for 400 GBD-IIIC lasers, I MEF (Forward) purchased 28 [Compact High Power Laser Dazzlers] CHPLDs.” The DOD IG recommended that “the Commandant of the Marine Corps perform a review of the circumstances that led to the purchase of the 28 unapproved lasers and, if appropriate, initiate administrative action.” That said, the IG “did not find any evidence of criminal negligence in Marine Corps processing” of the initial urgent request for laser pointers. According to the IG report—

The Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration responded for the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The Deputy Commandant agreed with the recommendation and stated that the Marine Corps will review the circumstances relating to the purchase of the 28 Compact High Power Laser Dazzlers.

We have previously reported on Defense Science Board findings that DOD bureaucracy impeded effective acquisition of materiel and services needed by warfighters. The DSB told Secretary of Defense Gates that “Current long standing [DOD] business practices and regulations are poorly suited" to the “dynamics of a rapidly shifting threat environment."

In addition, we have also described the procurement problems at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), who took six months to acquire $121,000 in needed IT network equipment, first going through the General Services Administration and then conducting a “best value” source selection—only to finally go back to the original source that was always going to provide the equipment anyway, and paying that source the appropriate market rate. Meanwhile, during that six month period of flailing about—

About a third of all National Archives and Records Administration personnel have lost regular access to email [and] personnel within NARA's office of general counsel have lost email service for at least a full day and senior management, including officials in the office of the archivist, have had diminished access,

So we can’t really say we’re surprised by the USMC failures described by the DOD Inspector General and reported by FierceGovernmentIT. But it saddens us that Marines in the field, risking their lives in service to this country, weren’t better served by their leadership and by the acquisition teams that support them. We hope all affected parties will do better—much better—next time.