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Home News Archive Secure Border Initiative Fails

Secure Border Initiative Fails

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In September 2006 Boeing beat Raytheon and was awarded the “Secure Border Initiative” (SBI) contract to “to secure U.S. borders and reduce illegal immigration, including an array of technical aids and elements on both the northern Canadian border and the southern border with Mexico.”  Known as “SBInet,” Boeing was to develop and install a “virtual fence” for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency (CBPA).  The SBInet contract was initially valued at $2 billion. 

On March 16, 2010, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano announced that she would reprogram $50 million from the SBInet contract and “spend it on proven, off-the-shelf technology to protect U.S. borders,”  according to this CNN storyCNN reported that—

As originally envisioned, SBInet was to give the United States control of its borders through a system of movable surveillance towers, high-tech sensors, radars, cameras and communication relays that would give Customs and Border Protection agents the ability to see and respond to intruders. But the system, which is being developed by Boeing, has come under withering criticism from the Government Accountability Office and others who say that it has been riddled with problems. Napolitano said the SBInet has been plagued with cost overruns and missed deadlines.

As a result, Secretary Napolitano said that she was freezing SBInet funding except for a 53-mile portion in Arizona, until a “re-assessment” of the project is complete.  Meanwhile, $50 million in ARRA stimulus funds that was to be used to “accelerate deployment of … surveillance technology and associated command and control technologies” would be reprogrammed and used to acquire “commercially available technology, including mobile surveillance, thermal imaging devices, ultra-light detection, backscatter (full body image) units, mobile radios, cameras and laptops for pursuit vehicles and remote video surveillance system enhancements.”

In February, 2010, Secretary Napolitano testified before the Senate’s Homeland Security Committee that “SBInet, a contract and a concept that was entered into years ago, has been plagued with troubles from day one… It has never met a deadline, it hasn’t met its operational capacities, and it doesn’t give us what we need to have.”  (Source: this Defense Industry Daily recap of SBInet history.)  The DID article links to several GAO reports critical of the project;  the article quotes GAO as reporting the following points—

·        SBInet technology deployment for the southwest border was planned to be complete by early fiscal year 2009. When last reported in February 2009, the completion date had slipped to 2016….

·        Important aspects of SBInet remain ambiguous and in a continued state of flux, making it unclear and uncertain what technology capabilities will be delivered, when and where they will be delivered, and how they will be delivered. For example, the scope and timing of planned SBInet deployments and capabilities have continued to change since the program began and, even now, are unclear. Further, the program office does not have an approved integrated master schedule to guide the execution of the program, and GAO’s assimilation of available information indicates that the schedule has continued to change. This schedule-related risk is exacerbated by the continuous change in and the absence of a clear definition of the approach that is being used to define, develop, acquire, test, and deploy SBInet…. While the program office recently issued guidance that defines key practices associated with effectively developing and managing requirements, such as eliciting user needs and ensuring that different levels of requirements and associated verification methods are properly aligned with one another, the guidance was developed after several key activities had been completed. In the absence of this guidance, the program has not effectively performed key requirements definition and management practices. For example, it has not ensured that different levels of requirements are properly aligned, as evidenced by GAO’s analysis of a random probability sample of component requirements showing that a large percentage of them could not be traced to higher-level system and operational requirements. Also, some of SBInet’s operational requirements, which are the basis for all lower-level requirements, were found by an independent DHS review to be unaffordable and unverifiable, thus casting doubt on the quality of lower-level requirements that are derived from them. As a result, the risk of SBInet not meeting mission needs and performing as intended is increased, as are the chances of expensive and time-consuming system rework.

·        SBInet program uncertainties, such as not fully defined program expectations, changes to timelines, and confusion over the need to obtain environmental permits contribute to ongoing delays of SBInet technology deployments…. According to program officials, as of August 2008, fencing costs averaged $7.5 million per mile for pedestrian fencing and $2.8 million per mile for vehicle fencing, up from estimates in February 2008 of $4 million and $2 million per mile, respectively. Furthermore, the life-cycle cost is not yet known, in part because of increasing construction costs and because the program office has yet to determine maintenance costs and locations for fencing projects beyond December 2008. In addition, land acquisition issues present a challenge to completing fence construction

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Rep. Bennie G. Thompson, D-Mississippi, chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, was quoted as saying that SBInet has been a "grave and expensive disappointment.  Today's announcement is recognition that this troubled program needs better management and stronger oversight."

We have written over and over that effective program management is the key to survival in the current (and future) budget squeeze.  SBInet is yet another example of the ramifications associated with poor program management.  There is no doubt in our minds that it will not be the last program to pay the price for unacceptable contract outcomes.



 

Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.