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Apogee Consulting Inc

DCAA Stomps on Ray of Hope Offered by DFARS Class Deviation

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We recently wrote about a “ray of hope” offered by the August 17, 2010 DFARS Class Deviation issued by the Honorable Shay Assad, Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy. The Class Deviation deleted the words “for contractors with approved billing systems” from DFARS language discussing DCAA’s authority to “authorize direct submission of interim vouchers for provisional payment to the [DOD] disbursing office.” In other words, whether or not DCAA authorized a contractor to directly submit its invoices to DFAS was no longer tied to the adequacy of the contractor’s billing system.

We thought this was great news, especially given DCAA official position on the matter (as expressed in the DCAA Contract Audit Manual), which was: “It is Agency policy to obtain the maximum contractor participation in the direct submission (direct billing) of interim vouchers program.” Great news, we thought, because now DCAA could follow its policy and restore the direct billing authority for all the contractors where that authority had been withdrawn based on inadequate or unaudited business systems (which, by the way, were not necessarily the contractors’ billing systems).

We thought it was also great news for the audit agency, because it could redeploy its scarce audit resources away from this non-valued-added activity toward areas with more risk and vulnerability for waste, fraud, and abuse. Given that the contractors were only submitting “interim vouchers for provisional payment,” the risk of overpayment was minimal. After all, those vouchers and contract costs were going to be reviewed again during the audits of the contractors’ incurred costs. Redundant audits made no sense, especially when DCAA was so under-resourced it could only audit 65% of the audits it was required to perform (by its own admission).

This was great news. Hallelujah! Or so we thought.

But we were wrong.

DCAA issued Memorandum for Regional Directors MRD 10-PPD-022(R) on August 26, 2010, in order to clarify that DCAA’s policy of denying contractors direct billing authority based on inadequate or unaudited business systems was unaffected by the Class Deviation. The MRD stated—

This deviation does not impact current DCAA policy for authorizing contractors direct billing authority (CAM 6-1007). Auditors should continue to use existing policy for authorizing contractors direct billing authority and the additional guidance provided in MRD 09-PPD-006(R), dated April 15, 2009.

Now it seemed to us that the intent of the Class Deviation was exactly aimed at impacting the current DCAA policy. But DCAA not only disagreed with our interpretation of the intent of the Class Deviation, it also asserted that the Class Deviation was issued at its request! The MRD reported—

The deviation was issued to address a DoDIG interpretation of the subject DFARS language. The DoDIG has interpreted that the DFARS language requires that a comprehensive evaluation of the billing system internal controls is required for all contractors to participate in the direct billing program. We determined that conducting such reviews at smaller contractors would not be a prudent use of audit resources or taxpayer dollars. DCAA currently performs other audit procedures tailored to the risk to the Government when authorizing nonmajor contractors to direct bill. Therefore, we requested the DFARS class deviation to allow DCAA to use its existing policies and procedures for authorizing the direct submission of interim vouchers for provisional payment to the disbursing office.

So according to DCAA, the Class Deviation applies only to “nonmajor” contractors, such as small businesses. The “major” contractors will continue to suffer delays in cash receipts.

First, we question DCAA’s interpretation. We don’t care what DCAA intended the Class Deviation to do; all we have to go on is what it says. The “plain language” of the Class Deviation removes the linkage between direct billing authority and business system adequacy. Period. The Class Deviation does not contain any express language that would limit its application only to businesses of a certain size or class. While it may be true that the intent was to make the Class Deviation applicable only to small businesses, that’s not what the regulation says—either before or after the deletion of the language.

Granted, DCAA has the authority to authorize or not authorize direct billing authority, and it can do so based on whatever rationale it wants to cook up. But at least its actions should be consistent with its own published policy, or so it seems to us.

Second, we note that, based on the date of the MRD, it should have been published on the DCAA website already. The website says it includes all audit guidance “open as of August 31, 2010”—but you can’t find this particular one listed there. DCAA has told contractors that it publishes all releasable open audit guidance every month, but this particular MRD somehow slipped through the cracks. We have to ask whether DCAA is trying to slip its flawed interpretation under the radar?

This is not the first time that DCAA has delayed, for whatever reason, publishing audit guidance for inspection by the public. Given the Obama Administration’s push for openness and transparency, we would have thought that DCAA would be eager to share all of its audit guidance with the public in a timely fashion. And just like our thoughts about the DFARS Class Deviation, we would have been wrong.

Perhaps we are overreacting to the situation. It wouldn’t be the first time! But here’s how we see it: DCAA is interpreting the current DFARS language (after implementation of the Class Deviation) in a manner that appears to be arbitrary, capricious, and self-serving. It appears to be interpreting the DFARS language in a manner that is inconsistent with its own policy statements and in a manner that actually harms its own self-interest, as it cannot redeploy audit resources to more fruitful areas as it should.

DCAA reports to DOD Comptroller Hale in a separate vertical from that of DCMA. But given that the Class Deviation was issued by the DOD Procurement and Acquisition Policy Directorate, one might think it would carry some weight with the DOD auditors. Can DCAA simply ignore promulgations it disagrees with—or reinterpret them in ways it finds more palatable? Or is this situation something akin to insubordination? We don’t know, but (frankly) nothing DCAA says or does surprises us anymore.

Finally, President Obama has issued an Open Government Directive, and that Directive applies to all Executive Agencies and Departments—including the DOD and its auditors, the DCAA. That Directive states—

Agencies shall respect the presumption of openness by publishing information online (in addition to any other planned or mandated publication methods) and by preserving and maintaining electronic information, consistent with the Federal Records Act and other applicable law and policy. Timely publication of information is an essential component of transparency. Delays should not be viewed as an inevitable and insurmountable consequence of high demand.

Given that DCAA is not publishing its audit guidance timely, one has to ask whether it is meeting the expectations established by the President’s Directive. Or is DCAA treating that Directive with the same strategy it has applied to the DFARS Class Deviation?

But perhaps that’s not all … Dare we say it?

Yeah, let’s go there …

By apparently ignoring the requirements of the Open Government Directive, is DCAA being insubordinate to the lawful orders of the Commander-in-Chief? In a time of war?

Okay, we admit it—we are definitely overreacting to the situation. But we’re concerned, and we’re asking tough (rhetorical) questions. If DCAA wants to email us an official response, we’ll be happy to post it here. And we’ll post it timely, too.

And you too can post your thoughts on this site. Every member can post comments here, and you are welcome to do so. Agree, disagree, or have a story to share? Feel free to leave a comment.



 

DCAA Helps Auditors to Communicate

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We recently told you about brand-new audit guidance (MRD 10-PSP-023(R)) that encouraged DCAA auditors to support DCMA contracting officer negotiations with contractors—but placed limits on that interaction. We asserted that some of those limits would leave “the contracting officer and buying commands stuck in limbo” for perhaps 90 days, “awaiting a supplemental report in order to have DCAA officially alter its original opinion based on receipt of new facts” provided by the contractors during negotiations. We liked the idea that DCAA HQ was encouraging its auditors to get back in the role of providing financial advisory services to DCMA, but we didn’t much care for the stringent limits and narrow-minded approach the audit agency placed on its auditors.

Thus, we were very interested in receiving an official DCAA PowerPoint presentation used to train auditors on the “’Rules of Engagement’ for Auditor Communications.” The presentation we received included the speaker’s notes in addition to the slides themselves. The presentation was undated; however, we believe it to be contemporaneous with the September 9, 2010 MRD discussed in the link above. If you are a site member, you can find the entire presentation here. For the rest of you, here’s a brief overview.

The presentation did more than encourage auditors to communicate with both requestors of audits and those being audited—it actually stated that such communications were required. The notes stated—

While GAGAS specifically addresses communication at the planning and reporting stages, communicating with the contractor and requestor throughout all phases of an audit is necessary to comply with other GAGAS requirements. For example, GAGAS 6.04b requires the auditor to obtain sufficient evidence to provide a reasonable basis for the conclusion expressed in the report. To obtain sufficient evidence, it is essential for auditors to communicate with the contractor to ensure that conclusions are based on a full understanding of all relevant facts. In addition, discussions with the requestor may disclose information relevant to the audit. Such discussions are a normal part of an audit and can be conducted without impairing an auditor’s independence.

As we’ve previously noted, the U.S. Air Force recently implemented a new process designed to facilitate the negotiation and final price agreement for Undefinitized Contract Actions (UCAs). We also noted that the DCAA issued audit guidance regarding the auditors’ roles in that process, which included attending the mandatory “proposal walk-through” for Government personnel. Tellingly, the presentation treated the Air Force’s focused UCA definitization process as the norm for all contractor proposals, including proposals to establish final indirect cost rates. The presentation stated—

At the commencement of the audit the contractor should provide Government representatives (e.g., DCAA, ACO, and PCO) with a ‘walk-through’ of its assertion (e.g., forward pricing proposal, incurred cost submission). The walk-through should generally take place after the auditor performs an initial adequacy review of the contractor’s assertion and may occur either before or during the entrance conference. At these meetings, the contractor should fully explain its assertion and allow the audit team to ask questions to fully understand the contractor’s assertion. This process will facilitate the early identification of any inadequacies with the contractor’s assertion that needs to be addressed.

Yikes! How did an Air Force process designed to expedite proposal negotiations with the contracting officer, in order to meet specific statutory deadlines, morph into this? Apparently, the walk-through is now hosted by DCAA “either before or during the entrance conference,” and not the contracting officer. It is now to be expected for all proposals, not just those for large sole-source procurements and for definitization of UCAs. And it is now to be used by DCAA to identify inadequacies, instead of to facilitate negotiations. How did we get from there to here? (Note: that was a rhetorical question.)

Much criticism has been leveled at DCAA—by us and many others—regarding the lack of communication with those being audited. In fact, we recently wrote—

[Audit] reports that have been issued, generally have been riddled with factual errors and other quality shortcomings, because (a) auditors are afraid to openly communicate with those they are auditing (as well as those agency customers requesting the audits), and (b) once the auditors reach a preliminary finding, everybody (from the auditor to the supervisory auditor to the branch manager to the regional audit manager) is afraid to change it—even when confronted by facts that would lead a reasonable person to a different conclusion.

So we were pleased to see the presentation emphasize that it’s perfectly okay for auditors to actually communicate with contractors during an audit. Moreover, preliminary findings should be discussed with the contractor so as to see if there are any facts that would tend to lead a reasonable person to a different conclusion. The presentation stated—

Discuss matters as needed for a full understanding of contractor’s basis for each item in submission or aspect of area being audited. Discuss preliminary audit findings (potential system deficiencies, FAR/CAS noncompliances, etc.) so that conclusions are based on a complete understanding of all pertinent facts. Through-out the audit, the auditor should discuss matters with the contractor as needed to obtain a full understanding of the contractor’s basis for each item in the submission, or each aspect of the area subject to audit. The auditor should discuss preliminary audit findings (e.g., potential system deficiencies, potential FAR/CAS noncompliances, etc.) with the contractor to ensure conclusions are based on a complete understanding of all pertinent facts. These types of discussions do not impair auditor independence and are generally necessary to obtain sufficient evidence to support audit conclusions.

We were also pleased to see that an exit conference should be held promptly “after completion of field work.” But despite that very helpful language, the presentation also contradicted that statement, saying that exit conferences were to be held “upon completion of field work and after supervisory review and FAO manager approval (or all management reviews if RAM/DAM review is required).” So which is it? We’ll post the exact language below and let you decide—

Upon completion of the field work, the auditor should hold the exit conference to discuss the audit results and obtain the contractor’s views concerning the findings, conclusions, and recommendations for inclusion in the audit report as required by GAGAS. Except for audits requiring RAM/DAM review, the exit conference may be held after the supervisor completes his/her review of the working paper and draft report but before the FAO manager completes the final review if the FAO manager believes it is appropriate based on his/her involvement with the audit, and/or the complexity of the audit and the experience of the audit team. In such cases, the auditor should inform the contractor that the results are subject to management review. For audits requiring RAM/DAM review, all applicable management reviews must be completed prior to holding the exit conference. The auditor should invite the requestor/contracting officer to the exit conference, especially if there are major or complex audit issues.

We want to be excited about this, we really do. But we think it’s more likely that the requirement for supervisory review of the draft report, and potential FAO manager review of the working papers and draft report, will mean that the contractor won’t hear about the auditor’s findings/conclusions until it is too late to affect them with explanations and facts. Yes, it’s true that “preliminary audit findings” are to be discussed with the contractor, but that really doesn’t happen very often. It’s great when it does happen, but the exit conference is also an opportunity to hear and rebut preliminary findings—or at least it used to be. Not so much anymore, apparently.

Moreover, the presentation included guidance that—

The information provided to the contractor at or in anticipation of the exit conference (i.e., draft report/results or, in the case of forecasted costs subject to negotiations, factual information) should be provided concurrently to the requestor/contracting officer.

So by the time the contractor learns about the auditor’s official findings/conclusions—but has not yet submitted a written response to those findings/conclusions—so has the customer. The customer gets an unrebutted audit report, one that lacks the contractor’s official response. That’s nice. (Note: that was sarcasm.)

To sum up, we expect to use this presentation in our interactions with DCAA, to try to force more open communication, especially to try to learn about preliminary audit issues before they get into draft audit reports. But we know from experience that the strategy will not always work. And now we know that if we don’t learn about those issues before the exit conference, then it will be too late—because the DCMA contracting officer will be receiving a one-sided report at about the same time we’re hearing the auditor’s findings for the first time.




 

DCAA Tells Auditors How to Support Contracting Officer Negotiations

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DCAA has published some significant audit guidance recently, much of which we have discussed on this website. We usually get access to new audit guidance (issued in the form of Memoranda for Regional Directors) a couple of weeks in advance of publication on the DCAA’s website. Recently, however, DCAA has experienced delays in putting its new audit guidance on the Internet; publication of some guidance has been delayed as much as six weeks. Typically, we wait to discuss new guidance until it’s available to the public, but now we’ve lost patience—and so we have some things to discuss with you.

First, you may remember that we’ve taken issue with the latest DCAA audit guidance that provides direction to auditors on how to evaluate contractors’ estimates of future indirect cost rates. For example, we had very few nice things to say about MRD 10-PSP-021(R) and many negative ones. Prior to that, we had even fewer things--and many more negative things—to say about MRD 10-PSP-018(R). Our overarching thought, based on the recent guidance, is that, in essence, DCAA as an organization has gone insane.

You can’t have worked in the arena of government contract cost accounting for the past two years and not noticed the intense barrage of criticism leveled at the audit agency—much of it politically driven, unwarranted, and based on flawed review methodology. One of the more frequent criticisms has been that DCAA has not met the independence standards imposed by generally accepted government auditing standards (GAGAS). That accusation hasn’t been true—or at least, it’s been rarely true—but it has driven the audit agency into a virtual obsession with maintaining independence. That obsession has impacted auditor interactions with contractors, DCMA contracting officers, and buying commands. As a result, issuance of audit reports has slowed to a crawl. And those reports that have been issued, generally have been riddled with factual errors and other quality shortcomings, because (a) auditors are afraid to openly communicate with those they are auditing (as well as those agency customers requesting the audits), and (b) once the auditors reach a preliminary finding, everybody (from the auditor to the supervisory auditor to the branch manager to the regional audit manager) is afraid to change it—even when confronted by facts that would lead a reasonable person to a different conclusion.

As we’ve noted many times on this website, it now takes roughly three times longer for DCAA to issue its audit reports, and those it does manage to issue don’t provide much value to anybody. We know DCMA is working hard to dissolve its dependence on the audit agency, and we recently noted some criticism from the DOD IG regarding DCMA’s efforts in that regard. Perhaps sensing that something must be done to turn the tide, DCAA issued MRD 10-PSP-023(R) on September 9, 2010.

Entitled, “Audit Alert on Auditor Attendance at Negotiations,” the audit guidance “encourages” DCAA auditors to support DCMA contracting officer negotiations—but also puts limits on that interaction. Following are a selected few quotes from the audit guidance—

  • It is DCAA’s policy to support contracting officers at negotiations where DCAA has issued an audit report on the contractor’s submission (e.g., price proposals, incurred cost submissions, termination claims), especially for complex submissions with significant audit issues. Attendance at pre-negotiation meetings with the contracting officer when requested to discuss audit report results is also encouraged.

  • Providing support and technical advice based on the auditor’s technical knowledge and expertise to help the contracting officer understand audit report results does not impair auditor independence. Answering questions about audit rationale/computations or giving advice regarding contractor rebuttals to reported results helps the contracting officer understand audit conclusions.

  • At times, contractors provide information and/or data directly to the contracting officer as a means to support their proposed positions in anticipation of or during negotiations. … The contracting officer may request DCAA assistance in understanding how that data impacts the reported audit conclusions. Auditors should support the contracting officer, to the extent possible, by providing advice on this data. This may include, for example, providing advice on the contractor’s rationale for a revised estimate, verifying data to the contractor’s books and records or other supporting data, or running various Government position scenarios using the data through audit report schedules and underlying spreadsheets, where appropriate.

The MRD includes a Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) section. Here is a quote from that section of the MRD—

[The auditor] should answer the cost analyst’s questions to help him understand the audit conclusions and rationale. Providing such explanations is a normal part of any audit and does not impair your independence or otherwise violate GAGAS. … On occasion, it may also be appropriate to provide selected working papers which support complex audit computations to facilitate the contracting officer’s understanding.

The foregoing sounds good and would appear to be aimed at facilitating negotiations. However (as we noted above), the guidance also limits auditor interaction with the negotiating parties. In particular, the MRD discusses circumstances in which the auditor should seek to issue a “supplemental report” instead of supporting negotiations. The audit guidance says—

if the data is complex and/or represents a significant update to the audited proposal, and requires extensive review or analysis, the auditor would generally need to issue a supplemental report. … When a supplemental report is not issued, any documentation provided to the contracting officer of the work performed should be clearly marked to distinguish it from audit report results. For example, it should include a statement noting that the documentation contains advice provided in support of negotiations and does not represent audited data, nor a revised audit opinion. Nothing short of a supplemental report will result in a revised audit opinion.

We note that, once again, DCAA refuses to let new facts get in the way of its prior audit findings—leaving the contracting officer and buying commands stuck in limbo awaiting a supplemental report in order to have DCAA officially alter its original opinion based on receipt of new facts. The FAQ emphasizes this audit guidance, stating that, where the new facts require “extensive review or analysis,” then the auditor should—

recommend in writing that the contracting officer delay the negotiations for that part of the proposal to allow time for [a supplemental report to be issued]. … in the meantime, the contracting officer [should] proceed with the negotiations for the other parts of the proposal. [Emphasis added.]

The MRD also directs that auditors cannot review data provided by contractors during negotiations unless they have first performed sufficient audit work to support an opinion on that data. In such circumstances, the audit guidance directs auditors to “recommend to the contracting officer that the FAO audit the costs and issue a supplemental report.” That supplemental report, as you readers know, will take roughly 90 days to issue. Meanwhile, negotiations are stalled, the contract schedule becomes unattainable, and the resulting delay leads to increased costs. Not to mention, somebody somewhere doesn’t get what they need to accomplish their mission.

Undersecretary of Defense (A,T&L) Dr. Ashton Carter recently emphasized the importance of schedule in program execution. As this interview of Dr. Carter at DefenseNews.com reports—

Q. What's most important: requirements, cost, schedule?

A. The variable we pay the least attention to is time. And time is money. The default way of dealing with a program that is costing too much is to buy it more slowly. The default way of dealing with a program that is not meeting its requirements is to keep working on it until it does. So a five-year program stretches 10 years, and a 10-year program stretches to 15. That costs money. Those stretches don't cost more money per year, and no one feels a cost increase over 15 years. We need more programs with a philosophy of meeting a strict schedule.

Dr. Carter, if you want to see programs embrace a philosophy of meeting a strict schedule, you might want to start with evaluating why negotiations drag on so long and program delivery dates have already slipped before the first labor hour has been incurred. And should you do so, you might want to review the impact of DCAA’s recent audit guidance on that process.

We’re just saying.



 

Will A&D Industry Embrace Rapid Prototyping?

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Our aim here at Apogee Consulting, Inc. is to move above and beyond cost accounting, contract administration, and other back-office matters, to see a bigger picture that encompasses all facets of a company’s business, including operations and program execution. We believe our viewpoint, created (as it were) from a higher perspective, creates more value for our clients. (Thus: the use of the term “Apogee” in our corporate name.) We like to demonstrate our higher perspective, from time to time, by focusing on issues such as technological innovations.

This is one of those times.

We previously discussed issues associated with the U.S. Army’s NextGen Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV). One of the more interesting aspects of that troubled program was the interaction of the rather prosaic armored vehicle with the utterly innovative approach to rapid prototyping and production envisioned for it by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). As you may recall, the Army reportedly intended to award nearly $1 billion during Government Fiscal Year 2011, to “start development of new prototype vehicles,” but the competition for the funding was halted because the Pentagon reportedly saw “risks in proceeding as planned.” Exactly what those risks were was not reported in any detail.

But we were sensitized to the ideas that: (1) more than one GCV prototype might be funded and those prototypes might be competed against each other, and (2) one discriminator in the competition might be the ability to rapidly field prototypes and subsequently modify those prototypes quickly in response to design changes. That latter concept is much more difficult to put into practice than it is to type on a page—especially for the aerospace/defense industry. As DARPA noted, its innovative prototyping/production concepts were “anathema to the current defense industry trend of tightly coupling design and prototyping through multiple design-build-test-redesign iterations.” Our thought is that the team that could break through the historical prototyping approach (as described by DARPA) would be able to dramatically reduce both cost and schedule—which would obviously be a clear competitive advantage.

Our heightened sensitivity led us to a recent Aviation Week & Space Technology magazine article on Selective Laser Sintering (SLS). “What is SLS?” we hear you asking. According to this article on Wikipedia, it is “an additive manufacturing technique that uses a high power laser … to fuse small particles of plastic, metal, ceramic, or glass powders into a mass that has a desired 3-dimensional shape.” The Wikipedia article continues—

The laser selectively fuses powdered material by scanning cross-sections generated from a 3-D digital description of the part (for example from a CAD file or scan data) on the surface of a powder bed. After each cross-section is scanned, the powder bed is lowered by one layer thickness, a new layer of material is applied on top, and the process is repeated until the part is completed. … SLS technology is in wide use around the world due to its ability to easily make very complex geometries directly from digital CAD data. While it began as a way to build prototype parts early in the design cycle, it is increasingly being used in limited-run manufacturing to produce end-use parts.

Here’s a five-minute infomercial on SLS.


The AW&ST article had some nice things to say about SLS, including that its “affinity for rapid prototyping of complex, thin-wall parts that are lightweight and high quality was a natural fit for specialized designs, like those in UAVs.” The article noted that the A&D industry began to use SLS early in the decade, on such programs as the F/A-18 and Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner—but so far the big users have been the UAV programs, which have more of a “let’s try it” attitude. Apparently, many defense programs prefer the cumbersome traditional design/build process that DARPA wants to move away from. As if to emphasize the cutting-edge nature of SLS, the article cautioned that “so far, the attraction [of SLS] extends only in the transition from design to reality [read: prototyping] and not into production.” Moreover, the article reported that, “most A&D work is for non-structural parts” and even the near-term growth curve includes only “structural non-flight parts.” In other words, A&D companies have been slow to adopt the new technology for parts produced in volume, and are afraid to embrace the promise that SLS, and related technologies, offer for rapid prototyping as well as full-rate production.

Is the A&D industry justified in its caution regarding SLS and related “additive manufacturing processes”? One individual read the aforementioned AW&ST article and was moved to write a letter to the magazine, stating that the article was “on the mark” regarding SLS technology. He wrote—

I spent 15 years in the telecom industry … In telecom, rapid prototyping, quick-turn tooling, new product launch protocols and top-notch program management help produce amazingly powerful and sophisticated products, utilizing teams of hundreds of engineers, outsourced to multiple facilities and complex supply chains, for a two-year cradle-to-grave life-cycle device with the durability to be dropped 6feet, small enough to fit in a pocket, and costing under $400. Thousands can be built for the cost of one modern weapons unit.

I returned to the defense industry as part of an outreach program intended to bring in new perspectives … For years … I spoke of SLS, 3DSL, MIMs, 3D Printing and Rapid Tooling. I gave impassioned speeches regarding the benefits of using prototype, dummy and rapid-molded parts for developing assembly process methods during pilot runs. All attempts were met with: “This is the defense industry, things don’t work that way here … we don’t have that kind of time/financing.” Yet, we blew past schedules, dumped tons more money into programs and struggled with quality issues.

It’s pretty clear that DARPA thinks defense manufacturing is ripe for fundamental change, a kind of quantum leap driven by cutting edge technology such as additive processes. Yet even though the benefits of fully embracing such technology are obvious, too many companies prefer to move slowly, one small step at a time. So the question is: where is the leadership that wants to drive the kind of revolutionary change DARPA is looking for? Where are the risk-takers? Where is the company that is ready to dramatically reduce the duration from design to prototype to full-rate production, and that will reap the commensurate benefits?

 

 

Congress Adds Teeth to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act

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The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) has two main provisions—(1) anti-bribery, and (2) books-and-records. The anti-bribery provision is enforced by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the books-and-records provision is enforced by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). See our previous article on the topic here. As we told you, the FCPA originated from public revelations of corrupt payments made by Lockheed (now known as Lockheed Martin) in order to induce foreign governments to purchase its planes. So the inter-relationship between aerospace/defense companies and the FCPA goes back to the beginning.

Military services contractor Blackwater (now known as Xe Services LLC) was accused of committing bribery (but not violations of the FCPA) in April, 2010. Here’s a blog post that explores the allegations against the company. It states that several company executives—

--were charged with 15 counts of conspiracy to violate firearms laws, making false statements and representations on federally licensed firearms dealers' records, possession of machine guns, possession of other firearms (short-barrelled shotguns) not registered in the National Firearms and Registration and Transfer Record, and aiding and abetting

The blog post linked to a November, 2009 article by the New York Times alleging that senior Blackwater executives “authorized secret payments of about $1 million to Iraqi officials that were intended to silence their criticism and buy their support after a September 2007 episode in which Blackwater security guards fatally shot 17 Iraqi civilians in Baghdad, according to former company officials.”

The blog post summed-up the situation thusly—

Four former employees the Times interviewed for the November story claimed the payments were approved by the company's president and money was wired to Iraq from accounts in Jordan. The employees didn't know if the payments were actually made. The [Times] report said ‘Blackwater’s strategy of buying off the government officials, which would have been illegal under American law, created a deep rift inside the company, according to the former executives.’


A report by the Times Friday said, ‘While the indictment is somewhat limited in scope, it could be the government’s opening salvo in a broader offensive to bring criminal charges against the company. They could include charges for bribery and export violations, according to officials familiar with the case, perhaps under a strategy of turning former and current executives of the company against one another.’

From Lockheed to Blackwater, defense contractors have been caught up in the apparent need to offer illegal inducements to foreign officials, in order to secure favorable treatment. But a recent law aims to add teeth to the U.S. enforcement mechanisms.

This GovExec.com story by Robert Brodsky reported that the U.S. House of Representatives had passed the 2010 Overseas Contractor Reform Act (H.R. 5366). Mr. Brodsky’s story reported that the law (if passed and signed) “would require agencies to debar companies and individuals found in violation of the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and sever their existing government contracts and grants.”

The proposed bill contains a provision for an agency head to waive the penalty. In addition—as Mr. Brodsky notes—many contractors have been able to craft artful settlement agreements with the DOJ “that allowed them to admit wrongdoing, but not necessarily confess to bribery.” Thus, companies such as Halliburton and BAE Systems, that have paid millions of dollars in FCPA settlement agreements, might escape the bill’s intent.

This article at Corporate Compliance Insights noted some other issues—

Because most FCPA enforcement actions are settled through a non-prosecution agreement (NPA) or deferred prosecution agreements (DPA) … the bill may need some tweaking if it is to be effective.

Among other issues will be: is a company that agrees to an NPA or DPA to resolve an FCPA case ‘found to be in violation of the FCPA.’ Likely not.

Also, the bill defines ‘final judgment’ as when ‘all appeals of the judgment have been finally determined, or all time for filing such appeals has expired.’ Again, this assumes that all FCPA enforcement actions are resolved through actual judicial proceedings – which is not how FCPA enforcement works in many cases.

Other potential shortcomings with the bill is that it only applies to violations of the FCPA’s antibribery provisions. Thus, the bill would not be triggered by the recent ‘bribery, yet no bribery’ cases (Daimler, BAE, and Siemens) … In these cases, despite DOJ allegations that would seem to establish that the company violated the FCPA’s antibribery provisions, none of these companies were charged with violating the FCPA’s antibribery provisions. Instead, non-FCPA charges or FCPA books and records and internal controls violations were charged in an attempt to avoid application of the European Union debarment provisions. …


The big picture flaw with H.R. 5366 (as currently drafted) is it assumes all FCPA enforcement actions are resolved through judicial proceedings and it assumes all FCPA enforcement actions are resolved with charges that actually fit the facts.

Neither of these assumptions are accurate ….

So perhaps H.R. 5366 is not the giant-killer its drafters hoped it would be. The biggest targets will likely continue to skate around the FCPA rocks without tripping. But for other (smaller) companies, it might be the “death penalty” as they lose the ability to be awarded new U.S. Government contracts, based on a poorly crafted settlement agreement.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.